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1. i NTRODUCTION 
The las t thirty yeC\rs have witnessed a continued growth in 
executive power-with virtu all y no check by the legislative branch. 
Regardless of which politi cC\ l pMty controls the Congress, the 
institution of the executive continues to grow and increase in 
power- par ticularly in the foreign affairs arena. While to many, 
the end of the Bush administration signaled the end of a perceived 
"power grab" by the executive branch, nothing could be further 
from the truth. This short Article will assert that since the 
founding of this journal thirty years ago, the United States has 
witnessed several changes that have inevitably led to this rapid 
expansion of executive power. Section 2 will discuss the Founders' 
intention that the executive be supreme in the arena of foreign 
affairs. Section 3 will explore executive power in the twenty-first 
century, particularly since 9/11 when the vast increases in 
technology and the ability to inflict n1assive harm in an instant 
(often by non-state ac tors) has necessi tated a. more aggressive, 
centralized decisionma.king process within the power of the 
executive. Additionally, the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the 
Congress have crippled its ability to actually "check" the executive, 
for fear of being perceived as "soft on terror" or "vvea.k on 
defense." With these considerations, this Article reconm1ends that 
President Ba.rack Obama continue to protect his executive 
prerogatives as the best means of promoting national security in 
the twenty-first century. 
Unfortunately, the real danger is not necessarily the 
understandable growth in executive power- it is that foreign 
affairs and wartime decisionmaking is going uncl1ecked by the 
Congress and is increasingly in the hands of the federal courts and 
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unelec ted/ life tenured judges and justices -- som e thing the 
Founding Fathers would have not, and could have not, ever 
anticipated. 
2. TH E EXECU TIVE N FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE FOUNDING 
The his tory of the power of the executive in the area of foreign 
affairs, and military operations in particu lar, is abundant with 
exan1ples of the Founders' intent. Their intent, partially in 
response to the failures of the Articles of Confedera tion, placed the 
Commander-in-Chief powers clearly in the Constitution- within 
Article II. 
One way to discern the Founders' intent on foreign affairs is 
through the lens of the m eaning of executive power at the time of 
the creation of the Constitution. In the eighteenth century meaning 
of the terrn, executive power clearly included the foreign affairs 
power as well as the power to execute the laws within the domestic 
United States . Thus, the Founders, aware of the failures of the 
Articles of Confederation in foreign affairs, military affairs, and the 
execution of laws, sought to remedy these problems by vesting 
such power in the Presidency. 
Some scholars and policy makers today, when reviewing the 
pre-revolutionary period and the revolutionary p eriod itself, argue 
the Founders were rejecting the crown and intended the legislature 
to be the s trongest branch. In some areas this is true- particularly 
with regard to domestic affairs. However, these critics, such as my 
friend Lou Fisher, rely upon the strength of the legislatures during 
this period as indicia the Founders wanted the legislature to be co-
equal- or in many ways, superior to the executive in the foreign 
affairs reaJm .1 However, I would suggest m y learned colleagues 
misinterpret the actual intent of the Founders. The legisla tures, the 
Continental Congress, and the state legislatures for the most p art 
were functioning as the "executive branch." Prior to the 
Constitution, there was no real executive branch in existence, and 
thu s, the '/ executive powers// in foreign affairs were ves ted in the 
legislatures. Even the great Chief Ju stice John Marshall later 
described it: "[t]he confederation was, essentially, a league; and 
congress was a corps of ambassadors, to be recalled at the will of 
1 Louis Fisher, Militnry Com111issions: Probiems of Au thority nnd Pmctice, 24 B.U. 
TNT' L. L.J. 15, 19-21 (2006) (describing the relatively expansive powers of Congress 
over military and forei gn affairs during the pre-revolutionZtry period). 
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their masters ." 2 Jack Rakove, a leading scholar today on th e 
Founders, notes that many Am.ericans during this period actually 
referred to the legislature as the "Supreme Executive" and the 
"Supreme Executive Council." 3 Rakove has further noted "the idea 
that Congress was essentially an executive body persisted beca use 
its principal functions, w ar and diplomacy, were traditi onally 
associated with the Crown, whose executive, political preroga tives, 
bear a very s triking resemblance to the powers of Congress . " ·~ The 
failures of this framework, however, led the leading thinkers of the 
day to reject this notion, and to create an executive branch to be the 
Commander-in-Chief and the sole person to conduct the nation' s 
foreign affairs. The Constitution once enacted, rejected the theories 
that tb e United States could function effici ently without an 
executive. 
Mos t scholars look to Alexander Hamilton, the most ardent 
supporter of a strong executive, for guidance when researching the 
original intent of executive power within the U.S. Constitution.s 
H e is well known to have sought an aggressive executive branch to 
meet the needs of foreign affairs and warfare. However, as 
Professor Michael Ramsey has written, even the era's leading 
legislative champion, Thomas Jefferson, saw the need to have an 
energetic executive.6 Jefferson said, "The Constitution has declared 
the Executive powers shall be vested in the President. The 
transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether. 
It belongs then to the head of that department, except as to such 
portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate." 7 Although 
not a Framer, per se, one clearly would not rely on him exclusively 
for discerning intent of the period. It is, however, important to 
note the leading anti-federalis ts of this nascent period of the United 
States also agreed with this no tion of the dominance of the 
executive in fo reign affairs, thus, helping better argu e and 
articulate the original meaning and intent of the Framers during 
2 }OHN Yoo, THE POWE RS Of W 1\R AND PEACE : THE CONS TITUTION Al'\ D FOREI GN 
AFFAIR
S 
AFTER 9/11 73-74 (2005). 
3 JAC K N. RAKOVE , THE BEGINN ING S OF NATI ONA L POLI TICS 383 (1979). 
l Id. (in te rna l citations om itted). 
THE FEDERA L.l ST No. 74 (Alexander Ha milton). 
{) Sec, Michael D. Ramsey, T11 e Textua l Ba sis of the President 's Foreign Aj)i1irs 
Power, 30 H arv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y '141, 141 (2006) (noting that Thomas je ffe rson 
advoca ted for an execu ti ve that had the power to execute laws and manage 
foreign relations). 
7 [d. 
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this period. It is reasonable to assert that if Hamilton and Jefferson 
agreed on this issue (possibly the only question upon which they 
truly agreed in the ea rly 1800s) - s trong executive power may be 
reasonably understood to be the intent of the Framers. 
The Framers a lso looked long and hard at certain state 
governments during the Revolutionary period to detenT'Iine how 
best to create an effective executi ve. H amilton particularly relied 
upon the state of New York in drafting the Constitution. In fact, 
Governor George Clinton maintained a strong executive 
throughout the 1770s and 1780s. The Framers co nsid ered New 
York to be the most s table colony during this era. Of importance, 
the New York Constitution, adopted in 1777, vested the Governor 
with the position of "general and comn1ander-in-chief of all the 
militia and admiral of the navy of the State."tJ Clinton exercised his 
unila teral and unitary power by sending troops to reinforce 
General Gates' efforts against the British. He only let the state 
legisla ture know of his actions several m onths later. The strength 
of the New York Constitution and government s trongly influenced 
New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Massachusetts when they 
crea ted their own s tate Constitutions as well. 
The Framers took the New York example to heart when 
drafting the federal Constitution in Philadelphia. They created an 
independent, energetic executive empowered w ith the robust 
authority to engage in foreign affairs, and conduct war. 
Additionally, they were strongly influenced by the enlightened 
thinkers of the day. Although popular culture often refers to John 
Locke as the most influential, in reality William Blackstone was by 
far the most widely read and influential political writer in America 
during the founding period. James Madison described 
Blackstone's Commentaries as "a book which is in everv man's 
0 
hand"9 and described Montesquieu as "the oracle who is always 
consulted and cited on the separation of powers."lll Both 
Blackstone and Montesquieu defined the execu tive powers to 
include foreign affairs. This area of foreign affairs, and most 
importantly carrying out warfare operations, was vested in the 
executive to ensure speed, flexibility, and dispatch. 
S N.Y. CONSTITUTION of 1777, art. XVTTI (1777). 
Y Virginia Ratify ing Convention: June 18, 1788, http: / /wvvw.constitution.org 
jrc/rat_va_15.htm (las t v isi ted Mar. 1, 2009) . 
111 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). 
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For exampl e, Montesquieu wrote, the executi ve "makes peace 
or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, 
and provides against invasions." 11 In m ilitary affairs, Montesquieu 
argu ed that the executive should possess exclusive control over the 
arn1y . He wrote, "[o]n ce an army is es tabli shed, it ought not to 
depend immediately on the legisla ti ve, but on the executive power; 
and this fron1 the very nature of the thing, its business consisting 
more o f ac tion than in delibera tion -"t 2 Again, the legisla ture 
retained the power of the purse as it does today an d the ability to 
termina te the authorization of the army. In the days of the 
standing army this power was significant and could. be analogized 
today to c-1uthoriza tion s to conduct military o perations. 
Similarlv, Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of 
0 
England declared the conduct of foreign affairs to be a 
quintessentially executive function. He defend ed the Crown' s 
authority in this area by decl aring, " [t]he King has the sole 
prerogati ve in making war and peace ... it vvould indeed be 
improper that any number of subjec ts shoul d have the power of 
binding the supreme magistrate, and p utting him against his will 
in a state of war." 13 Certainly, this can be ana logized to the various 
issues confronting our nation today as our armed forces are 
com mitted to fi ghting two wars. He fur ther declared the King to 
be the "generalissimo , or the firs t in military command, w ithin the 
kingdom."H These statements offer glimpses into the most 
influential thinkers of the era and give us a real concept of the 
thinking of our founding fathers as they debated how to create the 
executive branch . 
Beyond this understanding, w e need to look at this power from 
a functional perspective. President George Washington 
understood his role; having overseen the entire Convention, and 
upon taking office, he immediate ly ass umed the duties of 
Commander-in-Chief and the leader in foreign affairs. Vlithout 
any statutory authority, h e exercised the fo reign affairs functions 
that were not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, 
operations su ch as control and rem oval of diplomats, fore ign 
11 Yoo, supm no te 2, at 39 (internal c it<1tion s o mi tted ). 
i2 Jd. at 41 (quo ting 2 CH ARLES DE MOi'-.i"tESQUI EU , T HE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 
(Th omas N ugent tr<1ns. 1949) (1748) . 
13 Jd. at 41 (quo ting WlLL!AiVI B LACKSTONE , COMM ENT ARY ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLA ND 249 (1830)). 
14 Id. at 41. 
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communica tions, and form.ation of foreign policy. These powers 
were previously exercised by the Congress during the period of the 
Articles of Confederation and the new Congress certainly appeared 
to understand these powers had now shifted to the Presidency. 
There is no evid ence that anyone in Congress protes ted these 
actions, formally or informally. Thus, de facto, it appears to have 
been understood by the new government that the auth ority for 
foreign affairs and warfare became the sole province of the 
executive. 
Also, Hamilton, in the Pac~ficus essays, dea ling with 
Washington's proclamation of neutrality, noted this authority was 
sirTtply part of the traditional executive power over foreign affairs; 
this power w as ves ted in Article II of the Cons titution, and not 
granted to any other branch of government. His arguments arc 
now well known to l1ave carried the day. But it should be m ade 
clear these were not isolated proclamations by the genius 
Hamilton. Other prominent leaders of the 1790s, including 
Madison, John Jay, Oliver Ellsworth, John Marshall, and President 
Washington, similarly described foreign affairs powers as 
executive in nature. 
The ex treme of foreign affairs- armed conflict- was clearly 
intended to be embodied w ithin the executive branch. Blackstone, 
Montesquieu, the Federalist Papers, affirmations by the leaders of 
the day, as well as the conduct of the firs t president himself leaves 
little room to doubt the Founders' intentions in this arena. Again, 
this is not to say Congress has no role whatsoever. That is simply 
not the case. Congress has the power to declare war, and during 
combat operations the right to refuse to fund the war. Once 
warfare begins, however, it appears the need for rapid action 
necessitates a shift in the careful balancing act be tween executive 
and legislative power to the executive branch. The War on al 
Qaeda, however- with an enemy that d oes no t wear a uniform, 
provides n o institution wi th which to nego tiate, fl outs the laws of 
vvar, and whose membership is spread across over fifty nation 
states makes the n eed for dispatch more important than in prior 
conflicts. 
Of note, the development and intellec tual strength invested in 
crea ting a s trong executive in foreign affairs and during periods of 
armed conflict was well-established before the Constitution limited 
the term of a President to a maximum of eight years. 15 Since that 
15 U. 5. CONST. amend XXII. 
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amendment, regardless of the power exercised as President, no 
matter what happens, in four to eight years, an executive will be 
removed. As a result, the elec torate can have reduced concerns 
(since 1951, ·when the Twenty-Second A mendment was ratified) 
about excessive executive povve r by a Pr esident w ho might 
otherw ise run for nml tiple term.s. As a result, an "imperial 
presidency" is now firml y out of the realm of possibility. Thus, 
again, any accusa tions of an imperial presidency, or executive 
power grabs, or other references to tyrannical government asserted 
by some critics (particularly crit ics of President George W. Bush), 
appear hyperbolic within our exis ting Republic. 
3. E XECUTI VE POvVER IN THE TWENTY-FIRS T CENTURY 
The latter half of the twentie th cen tury w itnessed increas ing 
concern about the power of the execu tive to engage in co1T1bat 
operations withou t any input from Congress. The Vietnam War 
prompted Congress to enact the War Pow ers Resolution requiring 
the President to no ti.fy Congress if employing troops for longer 
than sixty to ninety days in any zone of combat. 16 Unfortunately, 
however, Congress has never fully asserted its constitutional, 
sta tutorily-empowered role in "checking" the executive with this 
power. 
Since the attacks of 9/ 11, the original concerns noted by 
Hamilton, Jay, and Madison have been heightened. Never before 
in the young history of the United States has the need for an 
energetic executive been more vital to its national security. The 
need for quick ac ti on in this arena requires an execu tive 
response - particularly when fighting a shadowy enemy like al 
Qaeda-not the delibera tive bodies opining on w hat and how to 
conduct warfare or determinin g how and when to respond. The 
threats from non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, make the need for 
dispatch and rapid response even greater. Jefferson's concerns 
about the slow and de liberative institution of Congress being 
prone to informational leaks are even more rel evant in the twenty-
first century. The advent of the twenty-four hour media only leads 
to an increased need for retaining enhanced levels of executive 
16 War Powers Resol ution of 1973, Pu b. L. No . 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 555, 557. 
The Congress has truly only asserted its au thority under this law once regarding 
troops being assigned in Beirut. See Multinational Force in Lebanon, Pub. L. No. 
98-119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983) (authori zing the use of force in Lebanon under the 
au thority of the War Power s Resolution Act). 
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control of foreign policy. This is particularly true in modern 
warfare. In the war on international terror, intelligence is vital to 
ongoing operations and successful prevention of attacks. Al Qaeda 
now has both the will and the ability to strike with the equivalent 
force and might of a nation's arn1ed forces. The need to identify 
these individuals before they can operationalize an attack is vital. 
Often international terror cells consist of only a small number of 
individuals -making intelligence that much more difficult to 
obtain and even more vital than in previous conflicts. The normal 
movements of tanks, ships, and aircrafts that, in traditional armed 
conflict are indicia of a pending attack are not the case in the 
current '/fourth generation" war. Thus, the need for intelligence 
becomes an even greater concern for the commanders in the field 
as well as the Commander-in-Chief. 
Supporting a strong executive in foreign affairs does not 
necessarily mean the legislature has no role at all. In fact, their 
dominance in domestic affairs rem.ains strong. Additionally, 
besides the traditional roles identified in the Constitution for the 
legislature in foreign affairs- declaring war, ratifying treaties, 
overseeing appointments of ambassadors, etc.- this growth of 
executive power now, more than ever, necessitates an enhanced, 
professional, and apolitical oversight of the executive. An active, 
aggressive oversight of foreign affairs, and warfare in particular, 
by the legislature is now critical. Unfortunately, the United 
States- particularly over the past decade- has witnessed a 
legislature unable to muster the political will necessary to 
adequately oversee, let alone check, the executive branch's 
growing power. Examples are abundant: lack of enforcement of 
the War Powers Resolution abound the executive's unchecked 
invasions of Grenada, Panama, and Kosovo, and such assertions as 
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, the USA Patriot 
Act, military commissions, and the updated Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act CFISA") . There have been numerous grand-
standing complaints registered in the media and hearings over 
most, if not all, of these issues. However, in each case, the 
legislature has all but abdicated their constitution a lly mandated 
role and allowed the judicial branch to serve as the only real check 
on alleged excesses of the executive branch. This deference is 
particularly dangerous and, in the current enviromnent of foreign 
affairs and warfare, tends to unintentionally politicize the Court. 
The Founders clearly intended the political branches to best 
serve the citizenry by functioning as the dominant forces in 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/4
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guiding the nation's foreign affairs. They had anticipa ted the 
politicC1l br anche s to struggle over who has primacy in this arena. 
In doing so, they had hoped nei ther branch vvould becom e too 
strong. The com.mon theme articulated by Madison , ambition 
co unters ;:ur:bition,ll intended foreign affairs to be a "give and 
take" be tween the executive and legisla tive branches. However, 
in action by the legislative branch on m yriad policy and legal issues 
surroundin \?; the "vvar on terro r" has forced the J· udicia rv to fulfill 
\... ' 
the function of questioning, di sagreeing, and "chec king" the 
executi ve in areas such as wartime policv, detentions a t 
G uan tan r no Bay, and tactics and strategy of intelli gence 
collection . The unique nature of the conflict agains t international 
terror cre0tes 111.:11w ar eas where law and nolicv arc m ixed. The 
0 l 0 
ac tions by the Bush adminis tration , in particular, led to outcries 
fro m manv on the left about his intentions and desire to 
-· 
unconsti tutiona lly increase the p ower of the Presidency. Yet, the 
Congress never firmly exercised the "check" on the executive in 
any formal rnc:mner w hatsoever. 
For example, many policym akers disagreed wi th the p ower 
given to the President within the Authorization to Use Military 
Force (" AUMF") .1S Arguably, this legis la tion w as broad in scope, 
and potenti ally granted sweeping powers to the President to wage 
the "war on terror." However, Congress cou ld have amended or 
withdrawn significant portions of the powers it gave to the 
executive branch. This lack of withdrawal or amendment may 
have been understand a ble when Republicans controlled Congress, 
but as of November 2006, the Democrats gained control of both 
houses of the Congress. Still, other than arguing strongly against 
the Presid ent, the legislature did not n ecessarily or aggressively act 
on its concerns. Presumably this inaction w as out of concern for 
being label ed " sof t on terror" or "weak on national securi ty" an d 
thereby potentially suffering at the ballot box. This vir tual 
paralysis is understand able but again, the p oli tical branches w ere, 
and remain, the trues t voice of the people and pro vide the m eans 
to best represent the country's beliefs , interes ts, ar1d national will 
in the arena of foreign affairs. It has been this way in the past but 
the rnore recent (certainly over the past thirty years and even more 
so in the past d ecade) intrusions of the judicial branch into w hat 
17 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). 
!o Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub . L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001) . 
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was intended to be a " tug and pull" be tvveen the political branches 
ca n properly be labeled as an unintended consequence of the lack 
of any real legislative oversight of the executive branch. 
Unfortunately, now nine unelected, life-tenured justices are 
deeply involved in war time policy decision making. Examples of 
judicial policy involvement in foreign affa irs are abundant 
including Rasul v. Bush;I9 Hamdi v. R ulll~{eld;20 Hallldan v . Runzsfeld;21 
as we ll as last June's Boumediene v . Bus/1 22 dec ision by the Supreme 
Court, all irnpacting war policy and interpre ta tion of U. 5. treaty 
obliga tions. Simply, judges should not pres umptively irTtpact 
wa.rfa rc operations or policies nor sho uld this become acceptab le 
pra.ctice. Without ques tion, over the p<!S t thirty years, this is the 
most dramatic change in executive power. It is not necessarily the 
s trength of the Pr esid ency that is the change we should be 
concerned about- the ins titutional search for enhanced power was 
anticipated by the Founders - but they intended for Congress to 
check this executive tendency w henever appropria te. 
Unfortuna.tely, this simply is not occurring in twenty-first century 
politics. Thus, the danger does not necessarily lie with the n a tural 
desire for Presidents to increase their power. The real danger is the 
judicial branch being forced, or compelled, to fulfill the 
constitutionally mandated role of the Congress in checking the 
executive. 
4. PRESIDENT OBAMA AND EXECUTIVE POWER 
The Bush presidency was, and continues to be, criticized for 
having a standing agenda of increasing the power of the executive 
branch during its eight-year tenure. Numerous articles and books 
have been dedicated to discussing these aUega tions.23 However, as 
argued earlier, the reality is that it is a natural bureaucratic 
tend ency, and one of the Founders prescien tly anticipated, that 
each branch would seek greater powers whenever and wherever 
possible. As the world becomes increasingly interdependent, 
technology and arm am ent become 1nore sophisticated, and with 
:q Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
2ll 1--!amcli v . Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (200-l). 
21 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
22 Boumedienc v. Bush, 553 U.S._ (2008) 
2J See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: T HE RETURN OF TH E IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DPv!OCRACY (2007) (outlining some 
of the more current criticism). 
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the rise of twenty-first century non-state actors, the need for strong 
exec utive power is not only preferred, but also necessary. 
Exec utive power in the current world dynamic is something, 
rega rdless of policy preference or political persuas ions, that the 
new President m.ust maintain in order to best fulfill his 
cons titutional rol e of providing for the n a tion' s security. This is 
simply part of the reality of executive power in the twenty-first 
ce n t ury.2 ~ 
In his flrs t months in office, President Obama has surpri sed 
some by embracin g severa l aspects of wha t many v iewed as efforts 
by President Bush to unconstitutionally broaden executive povve r. 
Spec ificall y, th e Obama Ju stice Department and White Ho use 
lawyers have sided w ith Bush on preventing disclosure of White 
House records; tl1ey have invoked the much mali gned Sta te Secrets 
Doctrine on a t leas t three different occasions (in a suit over the 
extraordinary rend ition program; in a suit on w ire tapping issues; 
and also in a suit brought by the citizens asserting their 
cons titutional rights were violated by the telecommunications 
companies); supported the Bush p olicies regarding detainees when 
the O bama Justice Department filed a legal brief maintaining the 
d etainees in Afghanistan do not have constitutional rights even 
thou gh held at an air base in Bagram; as well as on immigration 
where the n ew administration also supported doing workplace 
raids targeting illegal immigrants. 25 
Unlike the critics of these policies, I believe it is natural for an 
executive to assert its power in these arenas. The Obama 
administra tion, as its predecessors - both Democrat and 
Republican- have all done they can and should continue to 
maintain- or even further expand Presidential p ower within the 
arena of foreign affairs. The international situation demands an 
expansive executive power and the Congress is permitting it. 
Perhaps an area where the new administra tion w ould be pragmatic 
and help better atta in an appropriate cons titutional balance is by 
ensuring Congress is more fully briefed (if even with the Select 
2.J Sec Na ncy Bcnac, A mid 0/){m u/ s Clw ngc , Tlrere's Abo More of tl1e Sil iiiC, USA 
T ClD r\Y, 1vla r. I, 2009, nvailtJblc nt http:/ j w ww.usatoday.com/ncws 
/ washington / 2009-03-01-obam a_sa mcN.ht  ("Glenn Sulm asy ... sa id Obama is 
simp ly shi fti ng from campai gnin g to gove rning. ' It's just the real ities of executive 
po wer in the 21s t century,' Sul mas y said, ' \'Vhen you sit down and see the threa t 
of al-Qa id a and the threats to na ti onal security and homeland security, this wou ld 
be na tural and normal for him to take such s teps and measur es."' ). 
25 Id. 
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Intelligence committees) of actions that could be perceived by 
citizens- or even the courts·- as unconstitutional usurpations of 
power. 
Thirty years ago, there were great concerns about excessive 
expansion of executive power by the Nixon administration. In 
2009, many of these concerns remain. Just as the end of the Nixon 
era did not bring an end of such support of executive power, 
transfer of povver fron1 President Bush to President Obama did not 
significantly change the role or power of the executive. Indeed, in 
his first month as the Commc1nder-in-Chief, and as most students 
of history would agree, President Obama not unsurprisingly has 
furthered ITtany of the policies the Bush team asserted regarding 
executive power. 
As a result of the rise of non-state actors such as al Qaeda, the 
ubiquity of media coverage, and the increased likelihood of leaks, 
the need for rapid, coherent, and unified action by the executive is 
even more critical today than it was in the 1970s. However, 
Congress's role should be reestablished as the real, anticipated, 
and constitutionally required check on the executive. If Congress 
continues to play politics and never asserts itself, either through 
legislation, declarations of war, modifications of existing laws, or 
authorizations for force, the Judicial branch will continue the 
solitary check on executive power. This trend is cause for concern 
and it should be resisted. The new administration can change this 
course by fostering an improved relationship with Congress, 
where the legislature can be comfortable once again in asserting its 
constitutionally mandated role. 
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